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The Golden Triangle is the name given to the area of mainland Southeast Asia where 
most of the world‟s illicit opium has originated since the early 1950s and until 1990, before 
Afghanistan‟s opium production surpassed that of Burma. It is located in the highlands of the 
fan-shaped relief of the Indochinese peninsula, where the international borders of Burma, 
Laos, and Thailand, run. However, if opium poppy cultivation has taken place in the border 
region shared by the three countries ever since the mid-nineteenth century, it has largely 
receded in the 1990s and is now confined to the Kachin and Shan States of northern and 
northeastern Burma along the borders of China, Laos, and Thailand.  
The Golden Triangle is not only an isolated mountainous and heavily forested area 
overlapping the contiguous and outlying border areas of three countries, it is also populated 
by many extremely diverse ethnic groups, many of them tribal and semi-nomadic slash-and-
burn agriculturalists. In fact, the international borders of Burma, Laos, and Thailand also cut 
across two zones that are intricately woven together: the Tai linguistic zone, composed of 
Shan, Thai, and Lao peoples, over which is superimposed a more complex zone of numerous 
other ethnic groups that are dispersed throughout the tri-border area and in neighbouring 
China. The “Golden Triangle” expression was first coined by the United States Vice-
Secretary of State Marshall Green during a press conference on 12 July 1971. Referring to a 
polygon whose angles could be found in Burma, Laos, and Thailand, where opium 
production was indeed concentrated, Green implicitly acknowledged – and probably rightly 
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so – the absence of large-scale commercial opium production in China. This exclusion was 
all the more necessary as it was made three days prior to the announcement by President 
Nixon of his February 1972 official visit to the People‟s Republic of China, the first visit of a 
United States President to Communist China (Renard, 1996: 4). 
In addition to being a politically-grounded geographic reference, the expression 
“Golden Triangle” also refers to one of the region‟s most important economic features. 
“Golden” refers to opium production and trade, which developed considerably in mainland 
Southeast Asia over the course of the second half of the twentieth century. According to the 
Swedish journalist and veteran Burma-watcher Bertil Lintner, the first traders of the tri-
border region, especially those of the Thai-Burmese border towns of Mae Sai (Thailand) and 
Tachileck (Burma), exchanged the precious substance for 99 per cent pure gold ingots 
(Lintner, 1994), hence the name. 
Opium production in mainland Southeast Asia has always been concentrated in the 
tri-border region, in the mountainous borderlands of Burma, Laos, and Thailand, where 
rugged hills and mountains, heavy monsoon rains, and lack of transport infrastructures have 
long protected rebel armies and illicit crops from the writ of central governments and anti-
drug agencies. Ron Renard describes how the region has been favourable to the Golden 
Triangle‟s emergence: “The contraband trade in narcotics flourished all the more because the 
region‟s imposing terrain and rivers remain untamed by roads and bridges. The annual 
monsoon rains thus render the area even more inaccessible for several months each year” 
(Renard, 1996: 5). After decades of the expansion of poppy cultivation in the three countries, 
opium production has progressively receded, almost completely disappearing from Thailand 
in the 1990s, and seriously decreasing in Laos during the early 2000s. Poppy cultivation has 
abated, concentrating in northern and north-eastern Burma, where it had come from in the 
mid-nineteenth century. Although Burmese opium production has also considerably 
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decreased after 1998, it has nevertheless proven to be geographically and historically 
resilient. Burma‟s turbulent political history since its independence in 1948 can obviously be 
held responsible for Asia‟s longest illicit opium production: the opium economy and the war 
economy have clearly nurtured one another in a country that has suffered an internal war for 
the past sixty years and where the world‟s longest armed insurgency still takes place1. Indeed, 
as an extremely valuable economic resource opium has often enabled warring factions to 
fund their respective war efforts. Opium production has also weighed upon strategic 
negotiations, offering both state and non-state actors opportunities to gain political leverage 
or create ad hoc strategic alliances. For instance, the Burmese junta has very early and 
repetitively integrated opium in its negotiation strategy so as to affect power struggles, 
something that some anti-government forces have directly or indirectly benefited from. 
Indeed, “according to the account of Chao Tzang, Olive Yang [who dominated the opium 
trade in Kokang from the end of the Second World War until the early 1960s] „had been 
permitted by the Burmese to engage in opium trade in exchange for keeping out the KMT‟” 2, 
until “1962 when the Burmese army occupied Kokang and arrested her and her brother, 
Edward Yang, the Kokang Prince” (Renard, 1996: 56).   
The old drug trafficking routes of Mainland Southeast Asia 
Since the emergence of the Golden Triangle, opiate trafficking followed the main 
caravan axes of Southeast Asia and Southern China. Indeed, Chinese opium was already 
exported to Southeast Asia at the end of the nineteenth century, when Chinese production 
amounted to double of the imports forced onto the Middle Empire by the British. Also, the 
Haw, the Hmong and the other tribal populations who migrated from China to Southeast 
Asia, played an important role in spreading opium production in the Indochinese peninsula, 
and had a significant impact on the emergence of the Golden Triangle by perpetuating a few 
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trafficking and contraband routes. The caravan tracks of the Haw, which crisscrossed Siam 
very early, largely contributed in turning Thailand into a privileged hub of heroin trafficking.  
Mya Maung (Mya Maung, 1991) described the diverse commercial routes that feed 
Burma‟s black market from Thailand, China, and India. Mae Sai, Mae Sot, and Ranong, 
respectively in northern, western, and southern Thailand, have long been the main cross-
border towns along Burma‟s eastern border. Most of the trade occurring between Burma and 
Thailand used to happen between Tachileck and Mae Sai until cross-border commerce started 
being disrupted by ethnic rebellions and Communist guerrilla activities. Present-day trading 
routes, whether legal or illegal, are basically the same that the Burmese previously used to 
invade and raid Siam (in the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries for example). The passage 
from Moulmein to Myawaddy and Mae Sot is one of the most famous such invasion routes. 
In a similar way, the route followed by the Mongols when they invaded Burma in the 
thirteenth century has long been the main trading route between Burma (Muse) and China 
(Ruili): the so-called Jade Road was developed at the end of the seventeenth century by 
Yunnanese merchants and would only be known as the Burma Road during the Second 
World War. The Jade Road developed in order to export the highly-coveted and extremely 
expensive imperial green jade (jadeite) from Kachin State to China, where it is still highly 
prized (Mya Maung, 1991: 210-215; Walker, 1995, Frey, Lintner, 1995, Levy, Scott-Clark, 
2002). The Jade mines are located in Hpakant, in Kachin State, but after the Chinese 
Communist revolution its trade was diverted from China to Thailand, through Mae Sai and on 
way to Hong Kong, which quickly became the world‟s most important trading town for green 
imperial jade. It was not long, however, before Hong Kong turned into one the world‟s main 
heroin hubs. 
Thailand can be said to be the traditional outlet of Burmese opium and heroin and has 
long been the main outlet in Southeast Asia, at least since the emergence of the Golden 
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Triangle as such, and until Laos and China started draining increasing amounts of Burmese 
opiates towards Hong Kong, Macao, or Vietnam. After the post-Second World War 
emergence of the Golden Triangle there were in fact two main routes that we can henceforth 
consider as “traditional” because they were very much affected by the historic and 
geopolitical evolutions of Southeast Asia, and because they were more or less replaced by 
new routes. The first was an air route and has largely disappeared as of today. The second, a 
ground route, changed very recently and is at present of decreased importance. As for other 
routes which were once of minor importance, they have since been recently, and profoundly, 
modified. 
In his seminal work of reference on “The politics of heroin in Southeast Asia” (1972) 
historian Alfred McCoy has shown how the secret wars and covert operations carried in Laos 
and in Vietnam by the French, and then by the United States, spurred opium and heroin 
trafficking at regional and global levels. He revealed the role played by the CIA and one of its 
airline companies, Air America, which had taken over in 1965 from the French network of 
Corsican airmen, in the anti-Communist war effort of the United States as well as in the 
spread of heroin addiction among their own troops fighting in Vietnam. Air America, 
Continental Air Service, and Lao Development Air Service transported opiates from the Long 
Tieng and Vientiane airports in Laos – where the heroin was supplied by Hu Tim-heng, a 
partner of General Ouane Rattikone, one of Laos‟ major opium traders and the commander in 
chief of the Laotian Army between 1965 and 1971 – to Saigon. In Vietnam, the well-
connected Ma brothers dealt with the Vietnamese Air Force‟s Vice-Marshal Ky. Later, it was 
General Dang Van Quang, the intelligence adviser to Vietnamese President Nguyen Van 
Thieu and the commander in chief of the Vietnamese navy, who took over opiate trafficking 
from Cambodia to South Vietnam and Hong Kong (McCoy, 1991: 226-234; Booth, 1999: 
198). 
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Always in the context of its anti-Communist efforts, the CIA played a significant role, 
although an indirect one, if not in north-eastern Burma‟s opium production, then at least in 
the organization of its commerce by the KMT troops which it supported in its fight to take 
China back from the Communists. The vast majority of the opium traded from Burma to 
Thailand or Laos was conducted by the KMT troops, secretly supported by the CIA after their 
flight from southern China to Burma‟s Shan State. The caravans that transported the Burmese 
opium, under control of the KMT troops, were largely made of Panthay and Haw caravaners 
whose mules and networks allowed such traffic in the hills and mountains of eastern Burma 
and western Thailand. After the 1967 “opium war” that led to the defeat of Chan Shi-fu, alias 
Khun Sa (1934-2007)3, in Ban Houay Xay, Laos, the KMT – according to the CIA operative 
William Young – controlled about 90 per cent of Burma‟s opium trade from its bases in 
northern Thailand, while the Shan caravans then only transported approximately 7 per cent of 
Burma‟s opium and those of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), which were mostly 
loaded with green imperial jade, 3 per cent (Booth, 1999: 198). 
The KMT established itself in the north of Thailand after its Mong Pa Liao 
headquarters, along Burma‟s Mekong bank, were attacked by five thousand soldiers of the 
Burmese Army and twenty thousand Chinese Communist troops, in January 1961. The 
nationalist troops first fled to Luang Namtha province in Laos. But their repatriation to 
Taiwan, organized by the US Department of State whose embarrassment was all the more 
important that its support to the KMT had been made public, was organized via Thailand. 
Many of them, however, stayed in Luang Namtha until 1962, before they settled down 
permanently in Thailand, along Burma‟s border (in Mae Salong – now known as Santikhiri –  
for example). From that moment on, the KMT, which had been utilised by the CIA in its anti-
Communist agenda, could play a similar role for and from Thailand while being in privileged 
geographical position to resume its drug trafficking activities. 
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Thailand‟s history helps understand how the kingdom became the region‟s first heroin 
outlet after Second World War. First of all, Thailand has long been home to the world‟s 
largest community of Teochiu, or Chiu-Chao4, a Chinese diaspora from Swatow, in 
Guangdong. According to Sterling Seagrave, the son of the famed Burma Surgeon, the 
Teochiu constitute what is likely to be the most powerful and the richest of the world‟s 
underground networks (Seagrave, 1995). Forming probably one of the most fortunate of the 
overseas Chinese‟s networks, the Teochiu achieved a dominant economic position in Siam 
following the important political role that they played in the history of the Thai kingdom. In 
fact, in the Thai context of historic vassalage relations maintained with China, the role of 
economic adviser to the Thai monarchs had long been awarded to Chinese merchants and 
especially to Teochiu people. General Taksin (1734-1782), whose father was Teochiu, first 
assured the Teochiu a leading position in Siam‟s political and economic life by ennobling 
many of them after he reunited the kingdom which the Burmese had invaded in 1767. When 
Taksin the Great became king of Siam, in 1768, he moved the capital from Ayutthaya to 
Thonburi and the Teochiu advisers, whether noble or merchants followed him en masse. 
Later, during the Second World War, the Teochiu managed to secure a monopoly 
over rice commerce, thereby affirming their economic influence over the Hokkien Chinese5 
who, in spite of the fact that they were the world‟s most numerous and most dispersed of the 
overseas Chinese, had not allied themselves to the then occupying Japanese forces in 
Southeast Asia. This privileged position in the Thai politico-economic system also allowed 
four or five of the most important Teochiu syndicates to achieve a quasi-monopoly over the 
Golden Triangle‟s opium and heroin trafficking. Three leaders from some of the 1970s main 
Hong Kong-based Teochiu triads largely invested themselves in trafficking heroin from the 
Golden Triangle: Ma Sik-yu (alias White Powder Ma), Ma Sik-chun (Golden Ma), and Ng 
Sik-ho (Limpy Ho). Ma Sik-yu began trafficking heroin in 1967 and quickly gained direct 
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access to the source supply, that is, to the Golden Triangle, where he made contact with KMT 
General Li Wuen-huan who successfully recruited him as an intelligence agent for Taiwan. 
Southeast Asian Teochiu triads, controlled by Ma Sik-yu, infiltrated the Communist groups 
of the region while considerably increasing their drug trafficking activities. Thailand 
therefore ended in the centre of the system, benefiting from the importance and the 
connections of the Teochiu community as well as its central geographic position. Laos was 
also included in this system after the Ma brothers allied themselves with General Ouane 
Rattikone who was supplying them with the infamous “999” or “Double UO Globe” heroin 
(Booth, 1999: 195-198). In truth, the Teochiu were somehow predestined to become the main 
suppliers of the Golden triangle‟s opium and heroin since one of their Siamese commercial 
associations had very early on obtained an official license for opium retail sales in Shanghai‟s 
French concession: the first opium retail store of Shanghai, Hongtai, was owned by Teochiu 
merchants.  
Associated with Thai nationalism, irredentism, and militarism, these developments of 
the history of Siam, which became Thailand in 1937, facilitated the extraordinary importance 
of drug trafficking in the kingdom. During the Second World War, Thailand, supported by 
the Japanese, motivated by a rising Thai linguistic nationalism and nurtured by strong anti-
Chinese feelings, annexed Burma‟s Shan States (where Tai languages are spoken, such as 
Shan). Kengtung became the headquarters of the Thai Northern Army (or Phayap Army), 
under the orders of General Phin Choonhavan6 who acted as the military governor of the 
Shan States. Phin was one of the actors of the 1932 coup d‟état that eventually installed the 
Field Marshal Phibun Songkhram in power (1938-1944 and 1948-1957). Phin not only 
controlled the heart of what was not yet called the Golden Triangle; he also had privileged 
connections with some of the most powerful of Thailand‟s Teochiu syndicates. Another 
fundamental component of the Thai drug trafficking equation is the Japanese occupation of 
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the region and the presence of some of the instigators of the Japanese Army‟s southern strike 
in Southeast Asia: the same who, while in the Japanese Guangdong Army, had been involved 
in the marketing of Manchuria‟s opium in eastern Asia. In the 1930s, Japan was already 
funding part of its Chinese military expeditions by producing and trading opium from 
Manchuria (Meyer, Parssinen, 1998: Seagrave, 1995; Kobayashi, 2000). During the Second 
World War, the Japanese traded low-grade heroin bought from the Chinese Nationalist 
government in order to finance their occupying army in Guangdong (Booth, 1999; Meyer, 
Parssinen, 1998; Seagrave, 1995). Naturally then, the Japanese Army had a direct interest in 
supporting the occupation of the Shan States by the Thai Northern Army and encouraged its 
commander, General Phin, to build durable and lucrative relations with the KMT. 
Consequently, the role of the KMT in the development of the opium trade grew 
considerably. In China, the Japanese had established financial links with the Chinese 
nationalists and the Thai followed suit after General Phin met with General Lu Wi-eng, 
commander of the KMT‟s 93rd Division, in Yunnan, April 1944 (Seagrave, 1995). Five years 
later, when the Communist victory forced the KMT to flee to Burma, the 93rd Division took 
refuge in Shan State, along with its new commander, General Li Mi. Thus the links that had 
been tied between the KMT and General Phin proved useful as the exiled KMT troops 
“seized control of the best opium-growing areas in the Golden Triangle, and resumed a 
lasting military and commercial alliance with General Phin in Thailand – all made possible 
by Japan's wartime effort” (Seagrave, 1995: 159-161). 
After the war, and two years of democratic transition, Phibun and his military clique 
returned to power in Thailand. Phin was elevated to commander-in-chief of the armies, 
Marshal Sarit Thanarat became the commander of the First Army, thereby controlling 
Bangkok, and the son-in-law of Phin, General Phao Sriyanond, was made deputy director of 
the national police force. Phin, Phao and Sarit monopolized opium and heroin trafficking for 
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years and turned Thailand into a regional drug-trafficking hub. Phin and Phao successfully 
won control of two of the five main Teochiu syndicates of Thailand that oversaw the large 
majority of the opiate trade: from northern Thailand down to Bangkok‟s warehouses, and all 
the way to Singapore or Hong Kong and Taiwan. After 1948, when Phin seized power and 
became Prime Minister, Sarit was made commander-in-chief of the armies and Phao director-
general of the police. Two rival camps formed and both men engaged in a fierce competition 
over opium and heroin trafficking. 
Opiate trafficking became all the more important after the Shan State of Burma 
sheltered the defeated troops of the KMT. The 93rd Division, now commanded by General Li 
Mi, had successfully appropriated some of the region‟s best opium lands and assured the 
transport of opium and heroin to Thailand where Teochiu syndicates, the Thai Army, and the 
Thai police – controlled respectively by Sarit and Phao – safeguarded the shipments to their 
final destinations. Twenty years after Chiang Kai-shek‟s KMT had shared the proceeds from 
the Green Gang‟s drug trade, during the 1930s in Shanghai, the Generalissimo and his son, 
General Chiang Ching-kuo, ordered General Li Mi to resort to drug trafficking in order to 
subsist in its rear base. The United States also played a notorious role in the development of 
the drug trade between Burma and Thailand: the CIA chose to favour the most eager of the 
two competing Thai camps and supplied Phao and his police force with about 35 million US 
dollars worth of equipment between 1950 and 1953. Through its front organization, known as 
Sea Supply Corporation, the CIA delivered its material aid not only to Phao and his police 
but also to the KMT: in fact, the CIA provided Phao‟s police with the modern equipment that 
Sarit and the Thai Army were denied, and Phao and the Thai police in return protected the 
military shipments that the CIA was also sending to the KMT to support its hopeless attempts 
at reconquering Yunnan and China (McCoy, 1991: 184). As Alfred McCoy explains: “Since 
Sea Supply shipments to KMT troops in Burma were protected by the Thai police, Phao‟s 
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alliance with the CIA gave him extensive KMT contacts, through which he was able to build 
a virtual monopoly on Burmese opium exports” (McCoy, 1991: 184). However, in 1957, 
when General Sarit and his troops seized power from Phibun, Phao fled to Switzerland 
(where he died in 1960) and the opium and heroin trade fell into the hands of his long-time 
rival. 
Therefore, post-war Thailand emerged as a major trafficking corridor for opiates 
produced either in Burma or, despite Sarit‟s 1959 ban on opium production, on its own 
territory. The growing importance of drug trafficking in Thailand was clearly the direct 
consequence of a combination of several phenomena: on one hand, the deep penetration of 
the Thai politico-economic system by Teochiu syndicates and their use by the Thai leaders; 
and on the other hand, the role of the Japanese occupation forces, and the evolution of the 
role of the KMT, firstly in China, then in Burma and in Thailand. Also, the emergence of a 
nationalistic and irredentist Thailand during the Second World War allowed the kingdom to 
play a privileged intermediary's role between the KMT and Japan. This position that 
Thailand‟s Teochiu made possible eventually benefited their own networks and those of the 
Taiwan-based Hokkien; for these two Chinese communities have played a major role in the 
region‟s drug trafficking (Chouvy, 2002:  182). 
Contemporary drug trafficking routes of mainland Southeast Asia 
Thailand remained the main heroin trafficking route in Southeast Asia until the early 
1990s. However, a number of factors have contributed to the reorientation of drug trafficking 
routes within Southeast Asia and to the development of new routes to other parts of the 
continent. The Thai crackdown on heroin trafficking that took place after the 1984 nation-
wide opium eradication campaign considerably reduced the use of its well-developed road 
system by smugglers and traffickers from the Thai-Burma border. Subsequent patrols of the 
north and north-western Thai border by the Thai Third Army and the Border Patrol Police 
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also disrupted the routes used across the Thai-Burma border by opium and heroin traffickers 
(Chouvy, 2002: 173-199; Chouvy, 2009; Ko-Lin Chin, 2009). 
Yet, since the mid-1990s, the old paths of the former Communist Party of Thailand 
(CPT) through the mountain range stretching from Chiang Mai to Lampang, as well as 
outposts of KMT within Thailand (Haw Division 93 for example, in Mae Hong Son 
province), have been widely used by traffickers mainly carrying methamphetamine. Since 
1999, Thai authorities have reacted to these new trends by turning their Internal Security 
Operations Command (ISOC) from an anachronic and redundant anti-Communist task force 
to an anti-drugs unit. In the early 2000s, ISOC was used to complete a large defence system 
made up of the Border Police Patrol (set up by the CIA in the early 1950s), the Third Army7, 
and the National Security Council (Chouvy, 2002d)8. In the meantime, the Third Army 
launched its Territorial Defence Training Scheme, a programme intended to strengthen the 
Thai-Burma border by arming 592 border villages and training them for self-defence against 
incursions of armed groups and drug traffickers. In 2001, the Thai government, which hosted 
the annual Cobra Gold military manoeuvres with the US Army, set up a special fighting force 
dedicated to counternarcotics operations along the border. Task Force 399, based in Mae Rim 
(Chiang Mai) and made up of 200 men from the Thai Special Forces and Border Patrol 
Police, was assisted by 20 instructors from the US Special Forces‟ 1st  Group. Allegedly used 
by the United States to supply military equipment and covert drug interdiction training to 
Yawd Serk‟s SSA-S (opposed to Rangoon and the UWSA), Task Force 399 was dismantled 
in October 2002 after Rangoon complained about its “provocative actions” and denounced it 
as an impediment to friendly Thai-Burmese relations (Chouvy, 2009). 
The commercial opening of both southern China and northeast India since the mid-
1980s has also allowed the emergence of new trafficking routes. Heroin trafficking has 
followed the famed Burma Road since at least 1985, passing through the Burma-China border 
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posts of Muse and Ruili and continuing on through Baoshan, a nineteenth century Yunnanese 
hub of opium trafficking, then through Dali and Kunming (Lintner, 1998: 172; Malik, 1995, 
Zhou, 1999: 115). Spanning 1,200 km, the Chinese border has been increasingly traversed 
since Burma‟s junta legalised cross-border trading in 1986, and since the 1989 fall of the 
Communist Party of Burma (CPB) and the subsequent appearance of the United Wa State 
Army (UWSA)9 in northern Shan State (Renard, 1996: 62). A decade later, in May 1998, 
Chinese authorities estimated that at least 100 kg of heroin transited daily through Bose, in 
Guangxi province (Chouvy, 2002: 173-199; Chouvy, 2009). 
Other drug trafficking routes include those passing through the Kambaiti Pass or, 
further south, through Loije. From Yunnan, Burmese heroin can then reach eastern China and 
Hong Kong, to be eventually exported overseas to Australia and North America. However, 
large quantities of Burmese heroin are also bound for the Southeast Asian market, entering 
Laos through its Luang Namtha and Phong Saly provinces. China is prone to drug trafficking 
from Burma since its southern neighbour has an important Chinese population that consists 
of, among others, Panthay caravan traders, former KMT as well as CPB members, and local 
Kokang Chinese, all of whom are more or less involved in illicit cross-border activities and 
drug trafficking. The powerful attraction of both Hong Kong and Taiwan as major 
international heroin trafficking hubs is also likely to add to the appeal of the Chinese route 
(Chouvy, 2002; Chouvy, 2009; Ko-lin Chin, Zhang, 2007). According to the results of a rare 
field study of drug trafficking activities between Burma and China: “Over the past few 
decades, drug trafficking between Burma and China has evolved in several directions. 
Shipments of drugs in large quantities have largely disappeared (or perhaps are better 
concealed) and most drugs are moved in small quantities by large numbers of individuals, or 
“mules,” who know little about the organizers behind the scene. Between drug manufacturers 
and end users are multiple and often overlapping layers of transportation and distribution 
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networks, each involving only a few people. These groups of “mules” and their organizers 
work much like ants moving the contraband piece by piece successively from one location to 
another” (Chin, Zhang, 2007: 4). This phenomenon is not restricted to the drug trade between 
Burma and China: it has also been witnessed between Burma, Thailand, Laos, and India. 
While China is certainly the main transhipment destination for heroin from Burma, it 
is not the only one, as northeast India also draws some of the traffic. From poppy fields in 
northeast Burma, opium and heroin are transported by road, through Bhamo, Lashio and 
Mandalay to northeast India, which shares a 1,463 km border with Burma. Heroin trafficking 
across the India-Burma border was first noticed in the early 1990s, and six heroin laboratories 
were discovered in western Burma in 1992 (Lintner, 1998: 175). There are two main drug 
trafficking routes leading from western Burma to the Indian states of Nagaland, Manipur and 
Mizoram. The foremost route begins in Mandalay, continuing through Monywa and Kalewa, 
where it splits: northward, to the Tamu-Moreh border crossing and the Indian Road 39, in 
Manipur; and southward, to Hri-Champhai, into Mizoram (SAIN, 1998; Tarapot, 1997). 
Further north in Burma, Homalin is reached all the way from Bhamo and serves as a 
springboard into Nagaland, from where the heroin goes to Assam in India and, through 
Dispur, joins other shipments bound for Calcutta and the rest of the subcontinent. 
However, from Mandalay, Burmese heroin also goes to Rangoon, Burma‟s capital 
until 2005 and the country‟s largest town, either by road or by way of the Irrawaddy River. 
This upsurge in drug trafficking across the India-Burma border occurred in the context of a 
thriving contraband economy that has existed around Tamu-Moreh and Hri-Champhai since 
1965, despite the fact that cross-border trading was finally legalised in 1995. Political and 
social instabilities, armed violence linked with autonomous rebellions as well as state 
repression, and endemic underdevelopment and poverty, make a long and poorly manned 
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border prone to drug trafficking as well as the smuggling of precious stones, hard woods 
(teak), gold and various consumer goods (Tarapot, 1997). 
Drug trafficking and the spread of blood-borne diseases 
The existence of drug production in the area known as the Golden Triangle has 
contributed to the considerable increase in the consumption of opiates among Southeast 
Asian populations and even farther afield, along all the Asian drug trafficking routes. 
Consequently, the spread of opiate trafficking and the increase of their consumption led to an 
epidemic, only slightly later, of HIV/AIDS. The HIV/AIDS outbreak in Asia occurred 
between 1988 and 1990 and coincided with the multiplication and diversification of the Asian 
drug trafficking routes – from Southeast Asia as well as from Southwest Asia – and their re-
orientation towards the north, as well as with the spread of heroin addiction throughout the 
Asian continent. North of Burma, the Chinese province of Yunnan has not only become the 
region‟s main drug trafficking route but also accounted for 80 per cent of all China‟s HIV-
positive individuals in 1990. The area was then awash with Burmese heroin, and two-thirds 
of the injecting drug users of the Chinese border town of Ruili were HIV positive, as was also 
the case in Guangxi, the next stop on the traffickers‟ route (SAIN, 1998). In 2009 Yunnan 
and Guangxi still ranked among the six Chinese provinces with the most cumulative reported 
cases (UNAIDS, 2010a). 
The correspondence in Yunnan between the development of heroin trafficking, the 
emergence of intravenous injection – nowadays the main mode of heroin consumption – and 
the near-simultaneous waves of heroin addiction and HIV/AIDS infection, can now be seen 
all over Asia. A similar process occurred in northeast India where heroin trafficking from 
Burma quickly increased. As has happened in China, in the 1990s 80 per cent of the heroin 
addicts of Manipur, the main drug trafficking gate, were infected with HIV (SAIN, 1998; 
Beyrer et al., 2000). Manipur is still the Indian state with the largest HIV/AIDS epidemic, 
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where it appears that the disease began to spread at a particularly fast rate after the bilateral 
Indo-Burmese border agreement came into effect. In 2006 and 2007 Manipur was still the 
Indian state showing the highest adult HIV prevalence in India, estimated at over 1.5 percent 
(UNAIDS, 2010b: 18). Apart from law and order issues, the upsurge of heroin addiction and 
the raging HIV pandemic that have accompanied the development of the drug trafficking 
routes in southern China and northeast India now constitute one of the main challenges faced 
by Asia, the second most affected continent by the HIV/AIDS pandemic and the only one 
where HIV/AIDS first spread through injecting drug use (Beyrer et al., 2000). 
“New” routes for a “new” drug  
In the late 1990s, the diversification of drug trafficking routes increased together with 
the diversification of illicit drug production. The explosion of methamphetamine production 
in Burma, in which Khun Sa played a significant role (Lintner, Black, 2009: 62, 63), has led 
to resurgence in the use of the Thai route, since Thailand is by far the most significant 
consumer market of yaa baa, or methamphetamine. Despite that fact, Burma is still by and 
far the main producing country of methamphetamine in Southeast Asia (and maybe in the 
world), with Wei Xuegang10, the “de facto financial controller” of the UWSA, being the 
foremost “merchant of madness”, that is, the “heroin kingpin and overlord of most of the 
methamphetamine production in the Golden Triangle” (Lintner, Black, 2009: 67). The 
authors of Merchants of Madness actually list 16 major players in the production of and trade 
in methamphetamine in Burma, from Wei Xuegang to the Bao brothers (Bao Youxiang being 
the chairman of the United Wa State Party and supreme commander of the United Wa State 
Army), Bang Ron (allegedly leader of one of Thailand‟s largest methamphetamine trafficking 
networks until 1998, when he fled to Burma and linked to Wei Xuegang), and Yawd Serk 
(commander of the Shan State Army-South, on the Thai border) (Lintner, Black, 2009: 67-89, 
149). The strong crackdown led by the Thai army and the police in the early 2000s in the 
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northernmost part of the country has temporarily diverted the flux of methamphetamine, 
pushing traffickers to use new itineraries. Yaa baa, but also heroin, therefore started entering 
Thailand from Laos through border towns such as Chiang Khong, Nan, Loei, Nong Khai, 
Nakhon Phanom, Mukdahaern and Ubon Ratchathani. The roads of Laos are frequently used 
for transporting illicit drugs bound for Thailand, even though drug trafficking aboard 
speedboats along the Mekong River, which demarcates the international border between the 
two countries, is the preferred choice. This is exemplified by the February 2009 shootout that 
took place on the river between Burma‟s military and Naw Kham, a former soldier of Khun 
Sa and now leader of the small Hawngleuk militia, who began to levy a protection tax on 
drug shipments in 2007 as well as extort money from legitimate traders11. Since 2004 and the 
removal of river rapids in Burma and Laos, the Mekong has become a more profitable trading 
route (despite the construction of the transport corridors‟ multiple roads for the Greater 
Mekong Subregion or GMS) between China and Thailand, and as a result China then 
allegedly put pressure on Burma, Laos and Thailand to stop Naw Kham‟s extortion practices 
against Chinese cargo boats. The Thai Office of the Narcotics Control Board (ONCB) 
estimates that between 3 and 5 million methamphetamine pills enter Thailand from Laos each 
year12, through the numerous villages – such as Ban Ahi, in Laos (50 km north of Loei) from 
where methamphetamine, locally grown cannabis, and weapons enter Thailand – that straddle 
the border (Chouvy, Meissonnier, 2004). Police General Krisna Polananta, secretary-general 
of the ONCB, declared in 2010 that the Mekong had become “a major smuggling route”13. 
Further south along the Thai border and lower on the Mekong, Cambodia is also 
increasingly used as a staging point for trafficking methamphetamine via Trat and 
Chanthaburi into Thailand. The latest indication that Cambodia is such a staging point 
occurred in March 20011 when 11 kilogrammes of methamphetamine trafficked from Laos 
and destined to either Thailand or Vietnam were seized from Vietnamese and Lao nationals 
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in Phnom Penh14. Cambodia has also long been suspected of producing amphetamines, 
notably in Koh Kong province (including, reportedly in the late 1990s, on a boat off the 
coast), where most of country‟s cannabis used and is still likely to come from15. 
Methamphetamine production evidently developed in the following years as shown by the 
dismantling of a large laboratory in a cattle ranch in Kampong Speu province in April 200716. 
In another case, in August 2007, Cambodian authorities arrested the leader of a 
methamphetamine tableting operation in Phnom Penh, where they seized, for the first time in 
the country, a rotary tableting machine with the capacity of producing 10,000 
methamphetamine tablets per hour17. East of Laos and Cambodia, Vietnam has similarly been 
turned into a drug trafficking route, either from or to China. Overseas trafficking is frequently 
organised from Vietnamese seaports such as Hoi An, Danang, Vinh and Haiphong or from 
the Cambodian Koh Kong province or Pochentong airport (Phnom Penh). Vietnam is also a 
destination for Burmese heroin, the Hekou-Lao Cai border crossing being one of the most 
frequently used. Drug trafficking routes in Southeast Asia are becoming increasingly 
complex with traffickers constantly diversifying their itineraries, some of them sometimes 
taking national authorities by surprise. 
After the Second World War, Thailand was first avoided by drug traffickers coming 
from Burma because its police and army, as well as its leaders, were notoriously corrupt and 
cost the traffickers too much in bribes. Laos was thus originally used to bypass such added 
taxes. More recently, however, it is the tough anti-drug policy of Thai authorities that has 
been driving traffickers towards alternative routes such as Laos and Cambodia. In 1999, for 
example, Thai authorities increased the number of border checkpoints along its Laotian and 
Cambodian borders from 100 to 269, again encouraging the traffickers to resort to other 
routes. 
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In recent years, routes through southern Thailand have been on the agenda of both 
traffickers and anti-drug forces, particularly since March 2000, when several million 
methamphetamine pills were seized in Prachuap Khiri Khan, having been trafficked from 
Kawthaung, or Victoria Point, in Burma, to Ranong, Thailand. In January 2001, another 
seizure confirmed this reorientation of drug trafficking through southern Burma and 
Thailand. Close to eight million pills and 116 kg of heroin were seized aboard Thai fishing 
boats west of the Ko Surin islands, pointing to the Andaman Sea as a major drug route. 
Allegedly, most (80 per cent) of the drugs entering Thailand still come across the northern 
part of the Thai-Burma border, but the constant strengthening of Thai anti-drug actions has 
clearly fostered a wide diversification of drug trafficking routes as well as a diminution of the 
quantity of drugs being transported at any one time (Chouvy, Meissonnier, 2004; Lintner, 
Black, 2009).  
Drug trafficking in mainland Southeast Asia also happens to involve Nigerian or other 
West African (notably Ghanaian) traffickers. As the US Department of State stated in a 2000 
report, “Nigeria remains a worldwide hub of narcotics trafficking and money laundering 
activity. Nigerian organized criminal groups dominate the African drug trade, and transport 
narcotics to markets in the United States, Europe, Asia, and Africa”18.  Nigerian traffickers 
often base their heroin trafficking operations in Thailand to ship parcels to the United States 
or send Thai mules to China. A large-scale Bangkok-based Nigerian-run heroin smuggling 
ring involved in shipping heroin from Southeast Asia to the United States was dismantled in 
1996. At the time, Thomas A. Constantine, administrator of the U.S. Drug Enforcement 
Agency, declared that the international crackdown “immobilized an important international 
Nigerian syndicate, based in Bangkok, which smuggled heroin through Europe and Mexico 
and distributed it to street gangs in the Midwest.” Couriers were reportedly sent throughout 
Thailand and Cambodia to procure the heroin for the Nigerians drug dealers19. Nigerian 
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traffickers are often arrested in Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, and China. Nigerian 
mules are regularly arrested on heroin trafficking charges in Cambodia and in Vietnam, 
sometimes on their way to China, where arrest also happen and where Nigerian traffickers 
and Thai women used as mules by Nigerian or other West African drug traffickers are often 
executed20. 
Drug trafficking in post-2003 Thailand 
Upon taking office in February 2001, Thailand‟s Prime Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, 
vowed to prevent and suppress both drug trafficking and drug consumption within the 
kingdom. Past efforts to curb the rise of drug trafficking and consumption had failed as 
methamphetamine had become the country‟s drug of choice. As Pasuk Phongpaichit explains, 
one of the consequences had been the fast increase of the prison population: “Over 7 years 
from 1996 to 2002, Thailand‟s prison population increased by 250 percent. At the end of this, 
in Bangkok 70 percent of prison sentences were drug-related. For the whole country the 
percentage was 53 percent” (Pasuk, 2003). Thailand has long launched public campaigns to 
reduce demand and the Thai law prescribes the death penalty for carrying category I narcotics 
(heroin, amphetamine, methamphetamine, ecstasy and LSD, but not cocaine) “for the purpose 
of disposal”21. However, trafficking and consumption of yaa baa kept increasing and, on 1 
February 2003, Thaksin launched a nationwide “war on drugs” aimed at making the country 
drug-free within three months. 
Thaksin set the tone of his antidrug campaign when he declared, in his January 28 
speech: “Because drug traders are ruthless to our children. So being ruthless back to them is 
not a big thing [...] It may be necessary to have casualties […] If there are deaths among 
traders, it‟s normal”. Pasuk Phongpaichit stresses: “He also quoted a famous saying of a 
1950s police chief known to have masterminded several political assassinations: “There is 
nothing under the sun which the Thai police cannot do” (Pasuk, 2003). The Thai Government 
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and the Thai police drew arbitrary lists of drug suspects, establishing a climate of fear that 
drove intravenous drug users, in particular, underground. In a June 2004 report, Human 
Rights Watch explains: “the government crackdown has resulted in the unexplained killing of 
more than 2,000 persons, the arbitrary arrest or blacklisting of several thousand more, and the 
endorsement of extreme violence by government officials at the highest levels” (Human 
Rights Watch, 2004: 1). Many of those named on government “blacklists” and “watchlists” 
had been mistakenly included or reported by personal rivals and many were killed for no 
reason or for reasons other than related to drug trafficking. 
The 2003 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices of the US Department of State  
faulted the Thai government for the “excessive use” of “lethal force against criminal 
suspects” and denounced the many “extrajudicial, arbitrary and unlawful killings” that took 
place during Thailand‟s war on drugs.  The report stated: “According to official figures, there 
were 1,386 narcotics-related deaths between February 1 and April 30, 2003. No arrests were 
made in 1,195 of these cases, which led many observers to believe police were responsible 
for most of these deaths” (US Department of State, 2004: Thailand). To Thailand‟s human 
rights activists who blamed the government of unleashing a “shoot to kill” policy and 
condoning the killings of suspected-only drug dealers, the government replied that many of 
the killings resulted from dealers fighting each other. The campaign, however, has been 
popular in Thailand despite the fact that only a few large drug traffickers were arrested and at 
least a dozen managed to flee to Burma, Laos, or even China. 
Most observers agreed on the fact that “the violence unleashed by the Thai 
government on 1 February 2003 created terror and confusion among drug traders and users, 
which – not surprisingly – had a genuine impact on the supply of methamphetamines” 
(Roberts, Trace, Klein, 2004: 7). Some also warned: “the „ya ba‟ problem may have – to a 
certain extent – been temporarily suppressed, but that it has not gone away” (Roberts, Trace, 
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Klein, 2004: 7). Human Rights Watch concluded in its report: “The clearest outcome of the 
war on drugs was not to curb Thailand‟s illegal drug trade, but simply to make it more 
dangerous. Most drug users interviewed by Human Rights Watch reported continuing to use 
heroin or methamphetamines during the drug war, albeit at a higher cost and less frequently” 
(Human Rights Watch, 2004: 1). In late 2003, the Thai government claimed that the 
operation had been a “victory beyond expectation”. However, after yaa baa seizures 
increased again in Thailand22, Thaksin called for a second war on drugs in October 2004, this 
time with much less violence and publicity, despite a few heated declarations: “Drug dealers 
and traffickers are heartless and wicked.  All of them must be sent to meet the guardian of 
hell, so that there will not be any drugs in the country”23. In 2005, methamphetamine was still 
widely produced in Burma and in the rest of mainland Southeast Asia, where consumption is 
still developing. Still, in May 2006, a few months before he was ousted by a military junta, a 
newspaper stated that (on 19 September 2006), “Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra has 
pledged to step up the government‟s crackdown on drugs following complaints about the re-
emergence prevalence of drugs in several Bangkok districts”24. Thailand‟s wars on drugs 
obviously proved less successful at stopping drug trafficking to and within its territory than 
its thirty years of economic development at eliminating all but its opium production.  
In fact, starting in 2009, after a few of Burma‟s ceasefire groups, including the 
UWSA, refused to surrender their arms and join a Border Guard Force, tensions have 
considerably increased between those groups and Burma‟s junta, which resulted in Thailand 
witnessing a large surge in drug trafficking. Ceasefire groups are reportedly selling their 
stocks of heroin and methamphetamine in order to buy weapons and be able to better resist a 
potential assault by Burma‟s military. Seizures of both opiates and methamphetamine have 
considerably increased between 2008 and 2009: more than 2000 per cent for heroin alone25. 
In 2010, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) representative in 
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Bangkok, Gary Lewis, told reporters that 23 million methamphetamine pills had been seized 
in Myanmar in 2009, that is, twenty-three times more pills than in 2008. Lewis said that “the 
greater seizures reflected a rise in production rather than improved interdiction efforts”26. 
According to the ONCB, out of the 26.6 million yaa baa tablets that were seized in Thailand 
in 2009, almost half were in the final three months of the year, when tensions started to 
aggravate between the UWSA and Burma‟s military government27. As a consequence, in 
April 2009 Bangkok launched a new counter-narcotics campaign, the “Five Fences Strategy”. 
Designed to curb trafficking and consumption of illicit drugs in the kingdom, the Border 
Fence, the Community Fence, the Social Fence, the School Fence, and the Family Fence aim 
at “controlling drug abusers, drug traffickers, and groups of people who are sensitive to drug 
abuse (potential drug demand) in order to build up the front line to prevent drugs and control 
drug problems effectively”28. Also, in August 2009 Thailand quietly revived its former Task 
Force 399 into a new counter-narcotics force, the 151st Special Warfare Company, deployed 
along Burma‟s border29. 
The build-up of drug control in mainland Southeast Asia 
 With the beginning of the twentieth century a major change took place in the way 
narcotics and other drugs were addressed politically, socially and economically. Until then 
only the Indian-Chinese opium trade had been targeted by prohibitionists. Then, the United 
States initiated a global policy aimed at reducing both production and consumption of certain 
drugs. A long historical process then led to the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, to 
the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and to the 1988 Convention against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, three United Nations conventions 
that were introduced to help legislate and control the illicit drugs industry worldwide. In 
1998, a global strategy to reduce illicit drug supply was adopted during the United Nations 
General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on the World Drug Problem: regional and 
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sub-regional mechanisms, as well as stronger bilateral cooperation were called for in order to 
achieve a “drug-free world” by 2008. 
In 1993, China, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand and the United Nations International Drug 
Control Programme (precursor to UNODC) signed a Memorandum of Understanding for 
Drug Control, to which Cambodia and Vietnam became parties in 1995. At the 33rd 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Ministerial Meeting in Bangkok in 2000, 
ministers “took note of the threat from drug abuse and drug trafficking on the security and 
stability of the ASEAN region, particularly its relations with transnational crime” and called 
for a drug-free ASEAN by 2015. As a result, a regional framework called ASEAN and China 
Cooperative Operations in Response to Dangerous Drugs, or ACCORD, was launched. The 
commitment towards Drug-Free ASEAN 2015 gave the region a clear objective while the 
ACCORD Plan of Action outlined a road map towards that objective, yet without specifying 
expected outcomes or providing an ad-hoc menu of quantitative benchmarks. The fact that 
the United Nations had clearly failed to achieve a “drug-free world” by 2008 (as planned in 
1998) obviously did not deter the Southeast Asian nations to set their own unrealistic goal of 
obtaining a drug-free Southeast Asia. In fact, as the 2008 mid-term progress report produced 
by UNODC and ASEAN makes clear, the drug-free ASEAN goal was set without even 
defining what drug-free meant, therefore making any progress toward such a goal impossible 
to identify (UNODC – ASEAN, 2008: 5-6). Yet, while the same report acknowledges this, it 
also states that “the commitment of achieving a Drug-Free ASEAN by 2015 is still valid”, 
despite the fact that “the threat of a significant increase in the traffic of drugs due to the 
devolvement of infrastructure in the GMS and the implementation of trade facilitation 
agreements across ASEAN is significant” (UNODC – ASEAN, 2008: 85).  
Regional response plans that include specific interventions in key areas have been 
devised in order to counter drug trafficking in the region. ACCORD is the regional 
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framework set up to achieve such a goal. The operational arms of the ACCORD Plan of 
Action are four task forces, one for each pillar of action: the promotion of civic awareness 
(“advocating on the dangers of drugs”), the reduction of consumption (“by building 
consensus and sharing best practices in demand reduction”), the strengthening of the rule of 
law (“improved law enforcement cooperation”), and the elimination or significant reduction 
of production (“by boosting alternative development projects”). The ACCORD Task Forces 
meet annually to foster operational coordination through the creation of annual work plans 
involving the various national level drug control agencies: the Burmese Central Committee 
for Drug Abuse Control (CCDAC, established in 1975), the Cambodian National Authority 
for Combating Drugs (NACD, established in 1995), the Lao National Commission for Drug 
Control and Supervision (LCDC, established in 2001), the Malaysian National Anti-Drugs 
Agency (NADA, established in 1996), the Singaporean Central Narcotics Bureau (CNB, 
established in 1971), the Thai Office of the Narcotics Control Board (ONCB, established in 
1976), the Vietnamese Standing Office for Drug Control (SODC, established in 2000), and 
their other regional counterparts.  
Cross-border cooperation, mutual legal assistance and supply reduction are of course 
major objectives in order to achieve the goal of a drug-free ASEAN. UNODC has helped 
facilitate cross border cooperation via the Border Liaison Offices (BLO) mechanism. As 
explained in the 2008 ASEAN-UNODC mid-term report, “BLOs bring together law 
enforcement units from both sides of a land or water border and put in place protocols for 
joint operations” (UNODC – ASEAN, 2008: 77). As of February 2009, 70 BLOs had been 
established along the borders of Burma (8), Cambodia (11), Lao PDR (18), Thailand (18), 
Vietnam (8), and China (7) (UNODC, 2010: 12). India and Malaysia are not part of the BLO 
programme. According to UNODC, it is in the context of the BLO programme that Lao PDR 
and Thailand undertook the first joint patrols on the Mekong River in 2003. BLOs keep being 
26 
 
expanded and strengthened as they are seen by some as the premier method to enhance 
regional cooperation against drug trafficking, although it seems that BLOs are often far less 
efficient or useful than what can be expected from stated goals. Visits to a few of the BLOs 
dotting the Cambodian border (along the Thai, Lao, and Vietnamese borders) revealed an 
extreme lack of material means, barely existent cross border cooperation, and lack or absence 
of staff. 
While national governments, ASEAN and UNODC have made efforts against drug 
trafficking, no significant achievement will be reached without addressing illicit drug 
production in the region, mostly by addressing poverty, that is, the main driver of opium 
production, whether in Burma or in Afghanistan (Chouvy, 2009). Corruption is also a key 
issue to be addressed by the ASEAN countries and by UNODC, a topic that their above-
mentioned common mid-term report conveniently avoids. Yet, Burma ranks among the 
world‟s most corrupt countries, as Transparency International, which describes itself as a 
“global civil society organisation leading the fight against corruption”, reported in its yearly 
reports over the last decade. In 2009, only Afghanistan and Somalia were perceived as being 
more corrupt than Burma (178st most corrupt country out of 180). Laos ranked 158 along 
with Cambodia, while Vietnam ranked 120, and Thailand 84, along with India. China fared a 
bit better as the world‟s 79th most corrupt country. On the other end, Singapore was ranked as 
the world‟s third least corrupt country, well ahead of, for the sake of comparison, the United 
Kingdom (17th), the United States of America (19th), or France (24th)30. It is obvious that 
corruption hinders counter-narcotics efforts at various levels and especially at the trafficking 
stage. The proceeds of the illegal drug economy clearly feed corruption, as Willem van 
Schendel and Itty Abraham suggest when they describe how “the act of enforcing a selected 
flow of people and objects across a border, from border patrols to customs, immediately 
allows for the possibility of rents to be charged for circumventing these rules and by the same 
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token provides opportunities for smuggling of people and objects across these borders” 
(Schendel (van), Abraham, 2000). The difficulty of coping with drug trafficking therefore 
results not only from poverty – which makes drug production and trafficking even more 
attractive economically – but also corruption. Indeed, a lack of resources and fragile domestic 
institutions also undermine the efforts carried against both drug production and drug 
trafficking. 
Drug trafficking is only one aspect of the drug economy and while the goals of a drug-
free world or a drug-free ASEAN will never be reached, efforts can and should be made to 
minimise the harm caused by illegal drug production, trafficking, and consumption. 
Alongside demand reduction, harm-reduction policies, that is, the public health policies 
designed to reduce the harmful consequences associated with drug use and abuse, are of 
course a crucial tool against the spread of blood-borne diseases, notably along drug 
trafficking routes. On the other end, economic development is needed in order to provide 
alternative livelihoods to opium poppy cultivators: poverty, and more precisely food 
insecurity, is the main driver of opium production in mainland Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, 
economic development is not achievable without good governance; that is, without peace, 
political stability, the rule of law, and control of corruption.  
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1
 The Karen National Union (KNU) has fought Burma‟s central government since the country‟s independence, 
in 1948. 
2
 The Kuomintang (KMT), Chiang Kai-shek‟s Chinese nationalist troops who fought and lost against the 
People‟s Liberation Army (PLA) of the Chinese Communists, was going to deeply affect opium production in 
mainland Southeast Asia (Chouvy, 2009). 
3
 Opium production and trade developed all the more easily after Ne Win set up the Ka Kwe Ye (KKY), or self-
defence groups, whose mission and role was to second the government and the Armed Forces (Tatmadaw) in 
their combat against the rebels. Ne Win had tacitly authorized the KKY to engage in all types of business and 
trade, including the most profitable activity to be found in the mountainous peripheral regions where the KKY 
were to restore law and order: opium and heroin trafficking. Among the sixty or so KKY, which quickly 
constituted, the two most important were both headed by half-Chinese half-Shan chiefs: Lo Hsing-han and Chan 
Shi-fu, alias Khun Sa (Lintner, 1994; McCoy, 2003; Smith, 1991). Chan Shi-fu, “stepson of the ruler of Loimaw 
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